Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Steven L. Malan v. James C. Lewis and Brett Lewis :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsKeith E. Murray; Attorney for AppellantWendell E. Bennett;
Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Malan v. Lewis, No. 17606 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2579

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME

COUP:~·

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN !. . Mi\ UAN I
r I,·.'~

Pla i.nt;iff/AJ •pellant,
Cc>.se

--·~~·-·-

JAMES C • LEWIS and
BRETT LE 1i:S ,

...." ,

Def=ndants/Respondents.

-------------------BRIEF r.-:~ APPBLLMrl'

~~ '~-~_.i,:._
~

--··---·--···----------~.

,_,.":. ___

·~) !_,.
,·,•.;.
·~

·:<1/':~·

AJ-.peal from Jcdqment .gainE!~ Appe11:miit.·:
Judicial District -:our•. :'..n and fbx
·
Weber, stc.·::e o! Utah,. tile Bononllk·
1i.resiCin;.
:_!,··~·

.

-· -- -------------KBI'I'H E.

·
Bwabergl!r':·
205 . 2~~•./.

Atti>£111~1'

. .Q;;dsfi;
...

·!Jf:.

-)..,._

WENDELL E • BENNE'.L'T

Attorney for Responaente
.no E;ls i:: soo soutl1, Sui t.e 100
Salt Lake City, UT 841~1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE...............

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT........................

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . • • . • . • . . . • • • . . • . • . . • . . . . •

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS............................

2

ARGUMENT..........................................

2

CONCLUSION........................................

19

AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED:
Milligan v. Harward, 355 P.2d, 62............
Ricciuti v. Robison, 269 P.2d, 282...........
Stevens v. Stevens, 94, N.W.2d, 858..........
Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d, 70.................
Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d, 877............
Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d, 212................
Thompson v. Hagan, 523 P.2d, 1365............
Henry v. Bouder, 518 P.2d, 362...............
Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d, 67.............
Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District Court,
538 P.2d, 574...........................
Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d, 771 ••••..••. ,_
Critchley v. Vance, 575 P.2d, 187............
Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 548
P.2d,

2
2
8
9
10
10
11
12
12
14
14
15

624e•••••o•••o••••••••••••••OO••••

17

Code Ann. §41-9-1 (1953) •••••••••••.••••
Code Ann. §41-9-12 (1953) •.•.••.••.••.••
Const. Art. I, §l ••.•••.........••.•.•••
Const. Art. I, §2 ••••.•.•.••••.•.•••.•.•
Const. Art. I, §7 ••.••..••.•.. •.• .••••..•
u.s. Const. Art. I, §11 •..•••••.......••••••.
U.S. Const. Art. I, §24 ••••...••.••.•...••.••
Utah Const. Art. I, §2 •.•.....•..•.....•.••.•
Utah Const. Art. I, §24 •.••.•...••.•.......••

2
3
3
4
4
4
4
12
12

TEXTS:
Utah
Utah
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued
Page
TEXTS--Continued:
Nevada Const. Art. IV, §21...................
16 Arn. Jur.2d, §256, 724.....................

14
17

ARTICLE:
Broadbent, The Utah Guest Statute: Has It
overstayed Its Welcome?, Utah Law Review,
509 (1978) • . • • • • . • . . • • • • • • . . • • . • • • . • . • • •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------------------------STEVEN L. MALAN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
--vs--

Case No. 17606

JAMES C • LEWIS AND
BRETT LEWIS,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant was a guest passenger riding in an automobile being driven by Respondent, Brett Lewis.·
The parties entered into a written Stipulation in the
lower court stipulating as to negligence, contributory negligence, and damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist granted Respondents'
Motion For summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant is requesting that the lower court's
decision be reversed, and that a judgment be granted to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 1 Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant pursuant to the stipulated damages in the amount
of $15,000 and costs.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
It was stipulated in this action in the lower court
that the Respondent was negligent, the Appellant free from
contributory negligence, Appellant's damages exceeded $15,000;
and that, under the Utah Guest Statute, §41-9-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, the action would be barred.

The prior Utah

Supreme Court cases of Milligan v. Harward, 355 P.2d, 62, and
Ricciuti v. Robison, 269 P.2d, 282, which are similar factual
situations, would cause the court to have to deny recovery.
The only issue to be decided is the present constitutionality
of our guest statute.

The trial court granted Respondents'

Motion For Summary Judgment.
The Respondent, through inattention, ran off the road,
struck the guard rail, causing the Appellant to sustain compound fractures of his right leg decreasing its length and
requiring the wearing of a brace for the remainder of his
life.

His actual damages would be several times $15,000, but

this was the extent that any insurance recovery could be
collected from the driver, who is Appellant's cousin.
ARGUMENT
There have been numerous assaults on the so called
"guest statutes" in various states and in the State of Utah.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This law had been enacted originally in 27 states between
1922 and 1939 because of the lobbying efforts of the liability
insurance companies.

It now has been declared unconstitutional

or repealed in 17 of those 27 states.

Utah's Guest Statute,

§41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as follows:
"Responsibility of owner or driver of a vehicle to
guest.---Any person who as a guest accepts a ride
in any vehicle, moving upon any of the public highways of the state of Utah, and while so riding as
such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall
have no right of recovery against the owner or
driver or person responsible for the operation of
such vehicle • • • • Nothing in this section shall
be construed as relieving the owner or driver or
person responsible for the operation of a vehicle
from liability for injury to or death of such
guest proximately resulting from the intoxication
or willful misconduct of such owner, driver or
person responsible for the operation of such vehicle: • .
and §41-9-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines a guest as
follows:
"'Guest' defined.---For the purpose of this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined as bsing
a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without
giving compensation therefor."
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE
The Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the
Utah Guest Statute as being in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, of the
United States Constitution, as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
and the Equal Protection Provision of the Utah State Constitution in Article I, Section 2, as follows:
All political power is inherent in the people;
and all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and
they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require."
and Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution, as follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law."
and the right to be compensated for injuries, as stated in
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution, as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party."
and the Uniform operation of laws provision in Article I,
Section 24, as follows:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
A recent 1978 Utah Law Review article by David K. Broadbent,
page 509, discusses the Utah Guest Statute, "The Utah Guest
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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statute:

Has It Over Stayed Its Welcome?"

This article, on

page 510, quotes Dean Prosser as follows:
The typical guest act case is that of the
driver who offers his friend a lift to the office
or invites him out to dinner, negligently drives
him into a collision, and fractures his skull,
after which the driver and his insurance company
take refuge in the statute, step out of the picture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss.
If this is good social policy, it at least appears
under a novel front."
This article, further, discusses the guest statutes,
their origin, and rejection, further, on page 510, as follows:
"II.
A.

BACKGROUND OF AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTES
Conunon Law Origins

The development of the automobile early in
this century made it necessary for courts to determine the respective rights and duties of a
driver and his guest. A small minority of courts
held that only in cases of gross negligence would
drivers be liable for injuries to non-paying guests.
Such a standard was derived by analogizing automobile drivers to the conunon law gratuitous bailee,
and reasoning that 'justice requires that the one
who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitouslyshould not be under the same measure of obligation
as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay.'
The majority of courts rejected the bailment analogy, insisting that society has a greater interest
in human life and limb than in preserving property.
A host driver was consequently held by most courts
to the stricter standard of reasonable care.
B.

Rise of the Guest Statutes

The rational that one who undertakes a gratuitous task should be held to a lesser standard of
care than one who receives compensation for his
services was never accepted in more than a few
courts. It did, however, become the policy underlying automobile guest statutes. Enactment of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5 -

statutes in twenty-seven states between 1922 and
1939 has been attributed to an intense lobbying
effort on the part of liability insurance companies.
"
The Utah Guest Statute, enacted in 1935, was
patterned after California's guest act and was introduced to the legislature at the request of the
insurance industry. The statute denies any right
of recovery to automobile guests who are injured
or killed due to the host's negligence unless the
guest's injuries or death result from the willful
misconduct or intoxication of the host driver. A
guest is defined as one 'who accepts a ride in any
vehicle without giving compensation therefor.'
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO THE UTAH GUEST
STATUTE

In its purest form, equal protection of the law
means that no group of individuals are 'classified'
so as to receive treatment by the law different from
that received by the rest of society. Recognizing,
however, that classifications are inherent in any
legislative act, courts have usually given latitute
[sic] to state legislatures in formulating classes
for separate treatment. With the exception of cases
involving 'suspect classifications' or 'fundamental
interest,' which require a greater degree of judicial scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court, in
deciding the constitutionality of various statutes,
has applied a 'rational relation' test, also described as 'restrained review.' Under this test,
statutes pass equal protection muster as long.-as
the classifications do not rest 'on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective' and do not result in 'invidious discrimination.'
In extreme deference to legislative acts,
courts have occasionally hypothesized legislative
intent and purpose to sustain otherwise questionable legislation. Because of this wide leeway
granted to legislation and the failure of the courts
to require a rational relation in fact between the
classifications and objectives of a statute, the
'rational relation' test has been characterized as
offering 'minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact.'
In recent years the United States Supreme Court
has required a closer relationship between a statute's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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classifications and its objectives. In McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S., 263 (1973), for example, Justice
Powell's majority opinion inquired whether 'the
challenged distinction rationally furthered some
legitimate, articulated state purpose' and insisted
that the state's purpose for the statute be nonillusory.' In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., 71 (1971), where
the Court purported to apply a minimum scrutiny test,
equal protection was held to require that the classification 'be reasonable, not arbitrary, (and that
it) rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation • •
' At the same time, many state
courts are more strictly scrutinizing legislative
classifications that do not fall within the 'suspect
classification' or 'fundamental interest' categories,
and several courts have accordingly stricken state
guest statute legislation. In Brown v. Merlo, 506
P.2d, 212, for example, the California Supreme Court
declared:
Although by straining our imagination
we could possibly derive a theoretically
"conceivable," but totally unrealistic,
state purpose that might support this
classification scheme, we do not believe
our constitutional adjudicatory function
should be governed by such a highly
fictional approach to statutory purpose.
We recognize that in past years several
Federal equal protection cases have embraced
such an excessively artificial analysis .in
applying the traditional "rational basis"
equal protection test . • • • (But) we
believe that it would be inappropriate to
rely on a totally unrealistic "conceivable"
purpose to sustain the present statute
"Under this new test, characterized as traditional
equal protection with bite, judicial deference to
conjectural legislative purposes wanes as courts
look for actual, articulated purposes."
As is indicated in this article, there must be sane reasonable factual basis or rational classification to deny citizens
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1,
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2,of
the Utah State Constitution, which give "equal protection" to
all citizens.

It, further, appears that this statute is in

violation of Article I, Section

2~

of the Utah Constitution in

that it does not have "uniform operation with other laws; and,
further, contrary to Article I, Section 11, in that it denies
regress to "every person, for an injury done to him in his
person."

It is obvious to anyone who has had any experience

with personal injury litigation that this law is the "creator
of fraud" and the collusion is between the defendant and his
insurance company rather than the driver and the host guest.
It is "ludicrous" to assume Appellant and Respondent agreed
to have this accident so that Appellant would sustain in excess
of $5,000 in medical bills and have a crippled leg for the
rest of his life.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 355,
Mich., 363, 94, N.W.2d, 858, discussed the injustice in allowing a person to recover if their personal property were damaged
by host driver as follows:
The friends of the driver . • • must suffer
injury at his hands without recompense, solaced
only by the thought that, after all, the skull was
cracked by a friendly hand . • . . Wl¥? Because
the relationship between them was one of trust and
friendship. No money had changed hands. If, however, not the neighbor himself is carried to town,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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but rather his livestock to the slaughterhouse,
many modern courts will permit full recovery for
injury to the unfortunate animal through failure
to use reasonable care for its safety. Is this
one answer of an enlightened people to the hallowed question:
'How much then is a man better
than a sheep?'"
The assumption by legislators that collusion would be
created between driver and the host has no factual basis in
reality.

How many people would "plan an automobile accident"

with the uncertainty as to the extent of injury to recover
"easy money."

With the discovery methods and rights of medical

examinations by the defendant, the possibilities of some insurance company being victimized are at or less than zero.
Any plaintiff can "fake injury" in any negligence action or any
case, and the legislature has not yet decided to disallow all
rights of recovery for all injuries because of this possibility.
Why, then, is there any rational basis to say to the "slaughtered guest" you cannot recover for the driver's wrongdoing
because you were sitting in his car?

In some situations in the

negligence field an "invited guest" is offered a higher degree
of protection than the general public, e.i.,

maintenance of

premises, etc.
Regarding the ability of our judicial process to avoid
injustice and fraud or collusion claims, the California Supreme
Court in Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d, 70, stated as follows:
"It would be a sad commentary on the law if we
were to admit that the judicial processes are so
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ineffective that we must deny relief of a person
otherwise entitled simply because in some future
case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion.
Once that concept were accepted, then all causes of
action should be abolished. Our legal system is
not that ineffectual."

I

I

There have been numerous Utah Supreme Court cases con-

:J

struing the guest statute in recent years.

~

case is Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d, 877, where the court was

!l

The most recent

almost ready to "sua sponte" raise this issue on its own.

our

supreme court should now follow the decisions of several other
states in holding that the guest statute is in violation of
provisions of the constitution, mentioned herein.
A recent annotation in 66 A.L.R.3d, 532, contains a general
discussion of the constitutionalit.y of guest statutes and the
trend in recent years.

As of the writing of this article in

1975, as indicated on page 566, several states have now held
guest statutes to be in violation of the equal protection clause
of the United State Constitution.
decided in

197~

California, in Brown v. Merlo,

in 506 P.2d, 212, declared the California Guest

Statute to be unconstitutional at least in so far as it applied
to guests other than the owner of the vehicle in question on
the ground that it was in conflict with the state and federal
constitutional guarantees of the equal protection of the laws.
The court found there were two proffered justifications of the
guest statute, the protection of hospitality and the elimination of collusive law suits but concluded that neither constitute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a rational basis for the different treatment actually accorded
by the statute classifications scheme.
As indicated in the A.L.R. annotation on page 540:
"The arguments are myriad as to why guest statutes
fail to achieve their stated purposes and purported
justifications. It is difficult to find independent
opinion in defense of the merits of these statutes
and the commentators and law review contributors
are particularly unanimous in condemnation of them."
The State of Idaho, in the recent case of Thompson v.
Hagan, 523 P.2d, 1365, decided in 1974 the Idaho Guest Statute
was declared to be unconstitutional.
The purported justifications for the guest statute prometing hospitality, eliminating collusive law suits, and
placing the automobile guest into parity with a trespasser on
real property, were examined by the Idaho Court.

The conclu-

sion was reached that denial to a motor vehicle guest of a
cause of action against his host did not bear any rational
relationship to any of those objectives.

In this-case, the

Idaho Court states, on page 1368, as follows:
"To prevent the risk of fraudulent collusion, the
Guest Statute eliminates a negligence cause of
action for all guests. If, as the rationals suggests, a host will agree to fraudulently state that
he was negligent, there is nothing preventing him
from stating that he was grossly negligent or intoxicated in order that the guest may recover from
the insurer."

- ll Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The State of Kansas, in Henry v. Bouder, 1974, cited
in 518 P.2d, 362, likewise held the Kansas Guest Statute to be
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Kansas Bill Of Rights.
THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE IS IN VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM
OPERATION PROVISION OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
The guest statute is contrary to Article I, Section 2 and
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah State Constitution.

As in-

dicated, Article I, Section 2 allows regress to "every person
for injury done to him and his person."

Article I, Section 24

states that the laws must "have uniform operation with other
laws."
In a 1978 Wyoming case, Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d, 67,
the Wyoming Supreme Court, with an identical constitutional
provision guaranteeing "uniform operation of the laws," held
that the Wyoming Guest Statute violated that provision of the
wyoming State Constitution.

The court, considering the "legis-

lative ends of hospitality and gratuity" stated, on page 78,
as follows:
We as well fail to see how total denial of
recovery through the distinction the statute draws
can rationally be found to promote the legislative
ends of hospitality and gratuity. Even if at the
time of passage of a majority of the existing guest
statutes a lack of automobile liability insurance
allowed a rational basis to be found, such justification has been eroded away by time and changing
circumstances."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Concerning the argument that the guest statutes "prevent
collusion," the Wyoming court, further, held, on page 79, as
follows:
. Yet in furthering this obvious legitimate
state interest in the prevention of collusion, the
statute eliminates all negligence causes of action
for nonpaying passengers, a technique reminiscent
of employing a cannon to kill a flea. Not only is
such a method grossly over-inclusive, doing away
with negligence actions for an entire class of
persons solely because some portion thereof may be
'tainted by the mischief,' it is impractical as
well. If the mischievous parties would be tempted
to commit perjury or aid and abet a false claim
on the issue of liability to allow recovery, wouldn't
they be just as tempted to lie about the payment of
compensation for the ride and avoid the statute in
that way? McGeehan v. Bunch, supra. Our judicial
system is not helpless in this area, as it is well
armed with numerous implements for prevention and
detection of fraud including the penalties for perjury as well as the tools of cross-examination and
various discovery devices. As stated in Emery v.
Emery, 1955, 45 Cal.2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 225:
'Courts must depend upon the efficacy
of the judicial processes to ferret out
the meritorious from the fraudulent in
particular cases.'
"By barring all suits by guest passengers for ordinary
negligence, the guest statute exceeds all bounds of
rationality and in so doing constitutes a denial of
uniform operation under the Wyoming Constitution.
By way of summary, we conclude that the distinction drawn by the Wyoming guest statute between
those denied and those permitted recovery for injuries inflicted by ordinary negligence do not bear
a substantial nor rational relation to the statute's
ascribed purposes of promoting hospitality, protecting against ingratitude, and preventing collusive
lawsuits. we therefore hold that the Wyoming guest
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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statute violates the guarantee of a uniform operation of laws established by § 34, Article I, Wyoming
Constitution. Further, cognizant that the determination is ours to make, we conclude that in
consideration of all the factors and any prior reliances involved, our holding should be applied
prospectively only, i. e., to this action and all
cause of action accruing after 30 days following
the date of this decision."
In 1975 the Nevada Supreme Court in Laakonen v. Eighth
Judicial District Court, 538 P.2d, 574, concluded that the
Nevada Guest Statute was in violation of Article I.V, Section 21
of the Nevada Constitution, which provides, with identical
language as Article I, Secticn 24 of the Utah Constitution,
that "all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the state"; and that it, further, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

That court, on

page 579, held as follows:
We conclude, therefore, that the denial of
recovery for negligently inflicted injuries to
those who by chance fall within the provisions
of NRS 41.180 does not bear a substantial and_
rational relation to the statute's purposes of
protecting the hospitality of the host driver and
in preventing collusive lawsuits. Such irrational
discrimination cannot stand in light of the applicable constitutional standards.
It is ordered
that a writ of mandamus shall issue, directing the
district court to enter an order of partial summary judgment, declaring NRS 41.180 unconstitutional."
The State of North Dakota in Johnson v. Hassett in 217
N.W.2d, 771, decided in 1974, also, found their statute to be

- 14 -
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unconstitutional that it did not operate uniformly because it
gave special immunity from liability for ordinary negligence
to a special category of persons.
"EFFECT OF APPLICATION IF UNCONSTITUTIONAL"
Another issue to be considered is assuming that our guest
statute is declared to be unconstitutional, what retroactive
effect would this ruling have?

The case of Critchley v. Vance,

575 P.2d, 187, was decided after the accident in the case at
bar, which occurred on April 9, 1977.

The general law is that

a statute that is declared to be unconstitutional is void from
the day of its inception and enactment and confers no rights,
benefits to anyone after that date.
The Idaho case of Thompson v. Hagan, 523 P.2d, 1365,
squarely addressed this issue.

The court, after declaring the

Idaho statute to be unconstitutional, then, on page 1370, discussed the effect of this ruling as follows:
Since this action involves a major change in
a host's liability in a negligently caused automobile accident, the question of its applicability
to past, pending and future cases must be addressed.
In the case of Linkletter v. Walker, the United
States Supreme Court made an exhaustive analysis of
retroactivity of court decisions. rt was held that
there are no constitutional requirements concerning
retroactivity, and it is a matter of discretion for
the state courts. Three different approaches to
retroactivity can be identified. The first approach
is the traditional rule which is derived from the
concept that courts do not pronounce new law, but

- 15 -
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only discover the true law. Under this approach
there are no new decisions, but only clarifications
of the true law which makes a decision applicable
to both past and future cases. The second approach
is the prospective rule. Under this rule a decision is effective only in future actions, and does
not affect the rule of law in the case in which the
new rule is announced. The third approach is the
modified prospective rule which is a combination of
the traditional and prospective rules. Under the
modified prospective rule, the new decision applies
prospectively and to the parties bringing the action
resulting in the new decision; or, to the parties
bringing the action and all similar pending actions.
"
To aid the courts in determining which rule to
apply, Linkletter v. Walker set forth the following
factors to be considered. First, the purpose of
the new decision must be analyzed in connection with
the question of retroactivity. The purpose of holding the automobile guest statute unconstitutional
is to prevent guests from being denied equal protection of the law. The purpose would be served by
applying the case to both past and future actions.
The second factor is reliance on the prior rule of
law. The possibility exists that hosts may have
offered rides to guests relying on the protection
of the guest statute from negligence actions.
Additionally, insurance companies may have relied
upon the guest statute in setting their rates.
The factor of reliance is very strong in this
action. The third factor is the effect on t~e
administration of justice. This factor takes into
account the number of cases that would be reopened
if the decision that the guest statute is unconstitutional is applied retroactively.
After weighing the three factors, it is concluded that the modified prospective rule should
be applied in this action. The decision holding
the guest statute unconstitutional applies to this
action and all pending actions at the date of this
decision, and it applies to all actions arising in
the future."

-
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As stated, the Idaho ruling applied to "this action and
all pending actions at the date of this decision."
The effect of a statute declared to be unconstitutional
is discussed in 16 Am. Jur.2d, 724, §256, as follows:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional
statute, whether federal or state, though having
the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but
is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose;
since unconstitutionality dates from the time of
its enactment, and not merely from the date of the
decisions so branding it, an unconstitutional law,
in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it
had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the
question that it purports to settle just as it
would be had the statute not been enacted. No
repeal of such an enactment is necessary.
Since an unconstitutional law is void, the
general principles follow that it imposes no duties,
confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no
power or authority on anyone, affords no protection,
and justifies no acts performed under it. A contract
which rests on an unconstitutional statute creates
no obligation to be impaired by subsequent legislation.
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law
and no courts are bound to enforce it. Persons convicted and fined under a statute subsequently_held
unconstitutional may recover the fines paid."
The dissent in Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
548 P.2d, 624, states as follows:
With that part of the main opinion, which
permits the action to proceed, I concur. I dissent
from that part of the opinion, which fails to strike
down the guest statute.
The guest statute was unconstitutional the day
it was enacted, it has been since, it is now, and
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it will continue to be so long as Article I, Section
11, Constitution of Utah, reads as it does, to wit:
All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.'
The guest statute is blatantly contrary to this
provision so much so it is a monstrous impudence.
In 1935, the legislature attempted to take away
an existing remedy for injury. leaving nothing in
its place. Such, it had no power to do. All prior
Utah cases upholding the guest statute should be
overruled; and an announcement of the statute's
nullity made, before any more damage is done to the
hapless citizens of Utah, because of the invidious
discrimination visited on unsuspecting citizens by
this pretended law."
A dissenting opinion in Critchley v. Vance, 575 P.2d, 189,
stated as follows:
. if implied repeal of the guest statute__ has
not occurred by enactment of Chapter 41, Title 31,
a residuum of constitutionally impermissible discrimination remains against those automobile guests
who receive 'the most serious types of injury.'
I
believe this unreasonable classification within a
class, i.e., the class of 'guests,' is repugnant to
Art. I, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. Also, it
appears to me that singular irony obtains when a
legal system permits less injured guests to recover
though there is no negligence while the seriously
injured guest cannot recover when there is negligence."
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With 17 of 27 states having either declared their guest
statute to be unconstitutional or with it having been repealed
by the legislatures, it is apparent that this law creates unjust discrimination; and that this classification cannot be
permitted under the United States Constitution and the Utah
State Constitution, as stated herein.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Utah Guest Statute
should be declared unconstitutional for the reasons stated
herein, and that the lower court judgment be reversed; and the
Appellant granted a judgment in the stipulated amount of
$15,000 and costs.
Respectfully submitted,
~·

MU~:/.

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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